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• Nawrocki’s nominating party is known to have EU-skeptical stance. If the new president pursues a confrontational policy, it could harm Polish-EU relations and relations with partners with whom Poland was keen to strengthen ties
• Key issues on Nawrocki’s foreign policy platter concern, inter alia, Polish-German and Polish-French relations. Messages from Paris and Berlin showed openness to cooperation

The author is a former CEPA-HIF Andrassy National Security fellow and former cultural, press and public affairs attache at the Embassy of Hungary in Poland.

ISTANBUL

In the May-June period, Polish voters have had the chance to go to the polling stations for the fourth time in the span of 20 months – this time making a decision on the country’s president. The results (50.89% vs 49.11%) show a divided political scene in which the candidate of the largest opposition party won.

First and foremost, the results should be understood from a domestic political angle. As a result of the 2023 general elections, a heterogeneous coalition led by Prime Minister Donald Tusk’s Civic Coalition (PO), together with two smaller party groupings, came to power by securing a majority of MPs in parliament. Back in 2023, the fiercely contested race was won by a hair’s breadth; the coalition’s main promise was to "clean up after" their predecessors, Law and Justice (PiS).  

Midterm dynamics

Given the timing and the four-year long span of the Polish parliamentary cycles, the 2025 presidential elections were “midterm elections” in which voters formed their opinions about the coalition’s parties – and elected the candidate of PiS into the president’s office.

Karol Nawrocki, a 42-year-old historian, himself is something of a "dark horse," with his political experience limited to serving as a local district politician in Gdansk, a city of nearly half a million, from 2011 to 2017 – but that was enough to narrowly defeat the PO-backed mayor of Warsaw, Rafal Trzaskowski. Voters therefore showed a yellow or red card (depending on the interpretation) for the current ruling coalition. The situation is even more serious for the smaller coalition parties: both the New Left’s leftist candidate and the Third Way’s centrist candidate garnered less support than expected.

Voters shifted toward the political right, and various societal divisions – ideological, generational, educational, and geographical -- played a central role in shaping the final result. Nawrocki managed to secure his win by mobilizing most of the right-leaning votes and by – in the eyes of his voters – being immune to attacks that concerned his past deeds.

From a domestic political perspective, it is not possible to assess the results in a "one-dimensional" way: several factors shaped the result of the 2025 presidential elections. It is clear that there is growing dissatisfaction among young voters with both PO and PiS, the two parties that have defined Poland’s political landscape for decades—and Nawrocki secured votes by being less disliked than his opponent. Results show that voters shifted to the right: it is more than likely that electors held accountable the government for not dealing with problems that certain groups in the society (e.g., farmers, entrepreneurs) treat as key for their well-being and future. These groups want a business-friendly environment that extends to e.g., deregulation and tax reforms. Young voters are hit particularly hard by housing poverty: the cost of living, including rental housing, is constantly growing. On the left side of the political spectrum, ideology most likely played a role in shaping the final results: voters “punished” the ruling coalition for not solving one of their key promises, the liberalization of the Law on Abortion.  

Presidential powers vs. parliamentary majority

Given Nawrocki’s limited political experience and almost non-existent embedding in the Warsaw political scene, it is impossible to predict what exact line of policy would he follow. A few factors, though, define his playing field: he can propose legislation to the parliament, he has a say in shaping foreign and security policy, and he can veto bills that the government proposes. Regarding this last factor, a trap could emerge for both the government and the presidency: if the president vetoes the majority of bills, leading to a political deadlock, young voters could turn away from both PO and PiS in even greater numbers during the next general elections in 2027.

A domestic political deadlock could also easily have international consequences. The current coalition’s international room for maneuver is defined by steps their predecessors made in the last decade, and especially after February 2022. The Tusk cabinet continued policies that centered around pushing forward a security policy-driven foreign policy that aimed at securing a renowned, more influential position in international politics. This can be described as Poland becoming a regional middle power. There is a difference between a firm stance (in which defending national interests is the key driving force) and confrontation (where rapprochement between the parties can be hard due to the opaqueness of positions).

Nawrocki’s nominating party is known to have an EU-skeptical stance. If the new president pursues a confrontational policy, it could harm the Polish-EU relations and relations with partners with whom Poland was keen to strengthen ties. Key issues on Nawrocki’s foreign policy platter concern, inter alia, Polish-German and Polish-French relations. Messages from Paris and Berlin showed openness to cooperation – signaling that they view Warsaw as a key partner in shaping European foreign and security policy in the future.

* Opinions expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect Anadolu's editorial policy.